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INTRODUCTION

Recent proposals to revise Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to
incorporate cost allocation of discovery have sparked considerable
controversy. Advocates for reform argue that replacing the longstanding "producer-pays" presumption with something more akin to a
''requester-pays" rule would better align economic incentives and
reduce litigants' ability to wield discovery as an instrument to force
settlement. Opponents argue that such a reform would limit access to
justice by saddling requesters with an ex ante burden of funding the
opposition's discovery.'
In this Article, we explain that either a rule requiring both
parties to share the costs of discovery ("cost-sharing rule") or a rule
creating a risk for both parties that they will bear the entire costs of
discovery ("cost-shifting rule") would minimize many of the negative
incentives that exist under either a strict producer-pays or requesterpays rule. Whereas the producer-pays rule creates incentives for
excessive discovery because requesters can externalize the costs of
requests and use discovery to impose costs on producing parties to force
settlement, requesters under a cost-sharing or cost-shifting rule cannot
externalize the costs of discovery requests and have no incentive to
abuse discovery to force settlement because they bear the costs or risk
of that impositional discovery. Similarly, whereas a requester-pays rule
gives producers the incentive to drive up the costs of producing
discovery, a cost-sharing or cost-shifting rule forces producers to either
share the discovery costs or risk paying the entire cost, thereby
reducing the incentive to drive up the costs of production to deter
discovery requests. Moreover, while a requester-pays rule has the
potential to create an access-to-justice problem if financially
constrained litigants are overdeterred from making useful discovery
requests or bringing claims altogether, we propose including an undue
hardship exception to the default cost-sharing or cost-shifting rule to
minimize access-to-justice issues. We also explain that different costallocation rules provide opportunities for litigants to signal the strength
of their cases. Given concerns about the rising costs of discovery and
debate over discovery's acceptable scope, the ability of litigation signals

1.
It appears that the drafters of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted the
prevailing default rule-that the costs of discovery should fall on the party producing the
discovery-without attention to the incentives to which the rule gives rise. See Martin H. Redish
& Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural
Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 774 (2011) ("At the time of the Federal Rules' adoption in
1938, . . . apparently no attention, at any level of the process, was devoted to the question of to
which party, in the first instance, the cost of discovery should be attributed.").
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to convey relevant and important information without the expense of
discovery is potentially invaluable. Finally, whatever the approach to
the allocation of discovery costs, we argue in favor of greater clarity in
order to reduce litigation over cost allocation and encourage private
bargaining.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses current federal
law governing discovery cost allocation, with a focus on the setting of
electronically stored information-a setting in which discovery costs
tend to be especially high. Part II explains the incentives created by the
current producer-pays rule and how those incentives would differ under
a requester-pays regime. In Part III, we present our proposal for costallocation rules that would minimize many of the negative incentives
that exist under either a strict producer-pays or requester-pays rule.
I. THE FEDERAL LAW OF DISCOVERY AND COST ALLOCATION

Currently, in federal litigation, those who must comply with
discovery requirements bear the costs of that discovery. This Part
quickly canvases the governing law, with a focus on electronically
stored information.
A. The Basics of Discovery Requirements and Requests
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("the Rules") make some
disclosure mandatory and leave some discovery to the discretion of the
parties and the courts. First, Rule 26(a) makes pretrial disclosure of
certain matters mandatory.2
Beyond that, the Rules allow for parties to lodge broad requests
for discovery:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
3
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

2.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (listing the information one party must provide to other
parties); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (detailing materials exempt from initial disclosure);
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C), (D) (setting out the timeframe for initial disclosure).
3.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26(b)(1) further clarifies: "Information within this scope of
discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable." Id.
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In turn, the Rules allow for various discovery devices, including most
prominently oral depositions, 4 written depositions,5 interrogatories, 6
document requests,7 and physical and mental examinations. 8 The Rules
9
include some default limitations on the use of some devices, which
10
courts have discretion to amend.
Rule 26 requires district judges to "limit the frequency or extent
of discovery" if either "(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive"; (ii) the
party seeking the discovery has already had "ample opportunity" to
discover the same information; or (iii) the proposed discovery lies
"outside the scope" of proper discovery as contemplated by Rule 26.11
A special regime governs limitations to the discovery of
electronically stored information. 12 A party from whom discovery of
electronically stored information is sought may defend against a motion
to compel discovery or may affirmatively move for a protective order by
establishing that "the information is not reasonably accessible because
of undue burden or cost." 1 3 Even if the party successfully makes such a
showing, the court nevertheless may order discovery of the
electronically stored information, subject to conditions as the court may
see fit to impose, "if the requesting party shows good cause." 14
The 2006 Advisory Committee's Notes ("the Notes") provide
additional context as to how a court should decide whether the party
seeking discovery of electronically stored information has established
sufficient "good cause" to warrant green lighting the discovery. The

See FED. R. CIV. P. 30.
4.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 31.
5.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 33.
6.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
7.
8.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d)(1) (providing a default limit for the duration of oral
9.
depositions).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(A) ("By order, the court may alter the limits in these rules on
the number of depositions and interrogatories or on the length of depositions under Rule 30.").
11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
13. Id. The Advisory Committee's Notes ("Notes") to the 2006 amendments to Rule 26 explain
that a party responding to a discovery request that encompasses electronically stored information
"must ... identify, by category or type, the sources containing potentially responsive information
that it is neither searching nor producing. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2006
amendment. The identification should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the
requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the discovery and the likelihood of
finding responsive information on the identified sources." Id.
14. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
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Notes explain that, in determining whether there is good cause, a court
should
balance the costs and potential benefits of discovery. The decision whether to require a
responding party to search for and produce information that is not reasonably accessible
depends not only on the burdens and costs of doing so, but also on whether those burdens
and costs can be justified in the circumstances of the case. Appropriate considerations
may include: (1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information
available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant
information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily
accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot
be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance
and usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the
15
litigation; and (7) the parties' resources.

B. The Shifting of Cost
The astute reader will have noted that, to the extent it is a
relevant consideration in the discovery calculus, "cost" may potentially
limit the extent or scope of discovery. 16 Perhaps because the Rules
governing discovery costs have traditionally been justified as providing
access to justice for low-resource plaintiffs,1 7 they do not themselves
raise the prospect of shifting the cost of discovery from the party
producing information to the requesting party.
The "American rule" governing the allocation of litigation costs,
which generally applies in federal courts,1 8 leaves the costs with the
parties that incur them, regardless of who wins and who loses in the
litigation.1 9 Still, provisions of federal law leave the door open to cost
shifting, though the extent to which these cost-shifting provisions apply
to discovery costs remains unclear.
The possibility for cost shifting arises in two settings in the
context of electronic discovery. First, some courts draw authority to
assign the cost of production to the requesting party under certain

15. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
16. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of
Proportionalityin Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093, 1119 (2015) ("[T]he externalization of both costs
and benefits plays a central role in our discovery system.").
17. Benjamin Spencer, Rationalizing Cost Allocation in Civil Discovery, 34 REV. LITIG. 769,
773 n.12 (2015) ("[T]he poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate
their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel.").
18. See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010) (explaining
that, under the American rule, "[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney's fees, win or lose, unless a
statute or contract provides otherwise").
19. See, e.g., Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) ("We ... will
not deviate from the American Rule 'absent explicit statutory authority.'" (quoting Buckhannon
Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Hardt, 560 U.S. at 253 (referring to the American rule as a
"bedrock principle").
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circumstances. Second, some courts include the cost of production
among the costs that can be claimed by the prevailing party at the
conclusion of litigation. We explore the legal underpinnings for each of
these in turn.
1. Shifting Cost to the Requesting Party
It is possible for district courts in appropriate cases to shift the
cost of producing discovery of electronically stored information to the
requesting party. This power was not initially found in the Rules or any
accompanying Notes; courts developed a test for cost shifting on their
own. 20 The seminal case was Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, which
proffered a test for determining when cost shifting is appropriate. 21 The
test consists of seven factors, 22 with the factors appearing earlier on the
list enjoying more weight than those appearing later. 23
Zubulake predated the 2006 amendments to the Rules that
introduced special treatment for electronically stored information.
While the amendments themselves do not speak directly to cost
shifting, 24 the 2006 Advisory Committee Notes suggest a link between,
on the one hand, the inquiry into whether a requester has "good cause"
to obtain electronically stored information that is not reasonably
accessible and, on the other hand, cost shifting. They explain that the
good-cause inquiry is "coupled with the authority to set conditions for

20. In dicta in a 1978 opinion, the Supreme Court highlighted the power district courts had
to shift the costs of discovery. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)
("[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with
discovery requests, but he may invoke the district court's discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant
orders protecting him from 'undue burden or expense' in doing so, including orders conditioning
discovery on the requesting party's payment of the costs of discovery.").
For whatever reason, cost shifting of the discovery of electronically stored information
remained uncommon through the year 2000. See Vlad Vainberg, Comment, When Should
Discovery Come with a Bill? Assessing Cost Shifting for Electronic Discovery, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1523, 1535 & n.65 (2010).
21. 217 F.R.D. 309, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court in Zubalake built on an earliest test
developed in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (setting out an eight-factor test).
22. Zubalake, 217 F.R.D. at 322. These factors are:
(1) the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant
information; (2) the availability of such information from other sources; (3) the total
cost of production compared to the amount in controversy; (4) the total cost of production
compared to the resources available to each party; (5) the relative ability of each party
to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) the importance of the issue at stake in the
litigation and; (7) the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.
23. Id. at 322-23.
24. FED. R. CIv. P. 26; see Vainberg, supranote 20, at 1559-60 ("By presumptively prohibiting
the production of data from costly inaccessible sources, the two-tiered system created by Rule
26(b)(2) lowered discovery costs rather than redistribute them.").
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discovery" 25 and further specify that these "conditions may ... include
payment by the requesting party of part or all of the reasonable costs of
obtaining information from sources that are not reasonably
accessible." 26 Indeed, the Notes assert that "[a] requesting party's
willingness to share or bear the access costs may be weighed by the
court in determining whether there is good cause." 27
In the wake of the 2006 amendments, federal courts employ a
variety of tests in deciding whether to allocate costs to discovery
requesters. 28 Understanding the 2006 amendments to pertain solely to
whether discovery of electronically stored information should take place
at all (and not the question of cost shifting), some courts adhere to the
seven-factor Zubulake test. 2 9 Other courts have instead employed the
seven factors in the 2006 Advisory Committee Notes for determining
the propriety of cost allocation. 30 Still other courts have noted a
similarity between Zubulake's seven factors and the Advisory
Committee Notes' seven factors, concluding that factors from both
sources are "instructive." 31
The foregoing makes clear the difficulty faced by litigants and
lawyers in trying to predict whether a court will reapportion discovery
costs for electronically stored information to the requester. For one
thing, courts are divided over the appropriate test. Indeed, with
discovery issues not the subject of frequent appeal, 32 even courts within
the same circuit differ on the proper test.33 The various tests that courts
do employ are all balancing tests that call on judges to weigh numerous
factors. Such tests are the paradigm of judicial "standards" (as opposed
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
26. Id. The Notes explain that these conditions also may "take the form of limits on the
amount, type, or sources of information required to be accessed and produced." Id.
27. Id.
28. See Vainberg, supra note 20, at 1565 ("[W]hile the amended Rules have not brought
uniformity, this Comment's survey suggests that in the wake of their adoption, courts have become
more skeptical of cost shifting.").
29. See, e.g., Juster Acquisition Co. v. N. Hudson Sewerage Auth., No. CIV.A. 12-3427 JLL,
2013 WL 541972, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013).
30. See, e.g., Hudson v. AIH Receivable Mgmt. Servs., No. 10-2287-JAR-KGG, 2011 WL
1402224, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 2011); see also BRITTANYK.T. KAUFFMAN, ALLOCATING THE COSTS
OF

DISCOVERY:

LESSONS LEARNED AT

HOME AND ABROAD

12

(2014), http://iaals.du.edu/

sites/default/files/documents/publications/allocating the costsofdiscovery.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VVQ5-FHVL] ("Given that they are listed in the notes rather than the rule, the factors are not
binding. Nevertheless, they are highly informative and should be given weight in the analysis.").
31. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 637 (D. Kan. 2006).
32. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Unearthing Summary Judgment's Concealed Standard
of Review, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 87, 102 (2016) (explaining that the final judgment rule generally
precludes appeal of discovery motions in federal court).
33. Compare supra note 30 and accompanying text (applying the seven factors in the 2006
Advisory Committee's Notes to cost allocation), with supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting
that some courts use factors from both the Advisory Committee's Notes and Zubulake).
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34
to bright-line rules) that invite considerable judicial discretion; they
35
yield results that are notoriously difficult to predict.
Some courts, however, have employed more nuanced approaches
to provide parties with more certain outcomes. For instance, some
courts, relying upon Rule 26(f)'s requirement that the parties confer
36
about and develop a plan governing discovery, have directed the
parties to try to resolve cost allocation themselves before seeking
judicial intervention. 37 As another example, courts have made cost
shifting turn on the propriety-and to some extent the value-of the
information ultimately discovered. 38 Finally, courts seem amenable to
the party requesting discovery voluntarily assuming the costs of
production. 39

2. Shifting Cost to the Losing Party at the Conclusion of Litigation
Besides shifting the costs of discovery of electronically stored
information from discovery producers to discovery requesters, some
courts shift costs from producers who ultimately win the litigation to
those who lose. Two provisions work in tandem to justify (if arguably)
such cost shifting. Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides: "Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides
otherwise, costs-other than attorneys' fees-should be allowed to the

34. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to
Define Federal Jurisdiction,65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 521 (2012).
35. See, e.g., id. at 522.
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
37. See In re Seroquel Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1769, 2007 WL 219989, at *5 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 26, 2007):
To the extent that any Party requests data that is not readily accessible, the Parties
shall comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in determining whether the
inaccessible data is to be produced and which Party will bear what portion of the costs
of production, if any, including the costs to process or review unique or nonstandard
data. The Parties shall confer concerning inaccessible [electronically stored
information] prior to seeking the Court's assistance.
38. See Boehm v. Scheels all Sports, Inc., No. 15-CV-379-JDP, 2016 WL 6462213, at *1 (W.D.
Wis. Nov. 1, 2016):
Several factors weigh in favor of granting plaintiffs' motion [on whether discovery is
appropriate]. ... So the court will order [Defendant] to permit a neutral third party ediscovery expert to inspect all electronic records and systems in [Defendant's]
possession, custody, or control .... Plaintiffs must pay the costs associated with this
inspection, but they may move to recover their costs as a sanction against [Defendant]
if the inspection uncovers any discovery violations.
39. See Thielen v. Buongiorno USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-16, 2007 WL 465680, at *3 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 8, 2007) (permitting a defendant corporation, which had been sued for allegedly fraudulently
enrolling the plaintiff in a cell phone text messaging subscription service, to image at its own cost
the plaintiffs home computer to determine whether the plaintiff had visited the defendant's
website or a website advertising the defendant's services).
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prevailing party." 40 In turn, Section 1920 of Title 28 of the United States
Code defines the costs that Rule 54 authorizes courts to shift. 41 As
relevant here, Section 1920 allows courts to shift to a losing party the
costs incurred by the prevailing party, including "[flees for
exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where
the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case." 4 2 Courts are
divided as to which costs of copying electronically stored information
fall within Section 1920's ambit. Some courts interpret the phrase "costs
of making copies" broadly, 43 others narrowly. 44
The foregoing highlights problems, similar to those we identified
above in the context of cost shifting to requesters, that litigants and
lawyers may encounter in trying to predict whether a court will
reapportion to the prevailing party discovery costs for electronically
stored information. For one thing, courts are divided over the
appropriate scope of costs that are subject to shifting. And even where
a court has the power to shift a cost, the court retains discretion to
exercise that power, or not.
C. Summarizing the Problematic Unpredictability Under the Current
Approach
Litigants and their attorneys face a daunting task in trying to
predict whether current law will allow the costs of discovering
electronically stored materials to be shifted. With respect to the shifting
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
41. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987) ("[Section] 1920
defines the term 'costs' as used in Rule 54(d).").
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012). A 2008 amendment put the words "copies of any materials" in
place of "copies of papers." Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-406, § 6, 122 Stat. 4291; see Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d
158, 165 (3d Cir. 2012) (tracing how this amendment originated from a recommendation to
determine if expenses related to new courtroom technologies should be taxable).
43. See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009) (dismissing plaintiffs'
argument that "it was improper to award [defendant] its costs for document selection, as opposed
to document processing" on the ground that "[t]he record supports [defendant's] characterization
of the costs" as having been incurred "for converting computer data into a readable format in
response to plaintiffs' discovery requests" and thus "recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920").
44. See Race Tires Am., 674 F.3d at 167 ("[O]nly the conversion of native files to ... the
agreed-upon default format for production of [the electronically stored information] ... , and the
scanning of documents to create digital duplicates are generally recognized as the taxable 'making
copies of material.' "); id. at 169:
Section 1920(4) does not state that all steps that lead up to the production of copies of
materials are taxable. It does not authorize taxation merely because today's technology
requires technical expertise not ordinarily possessed by the typical legal professional. It
does not say that activities that encourage cost savings may be taxed. Section 1920(4)
authorizes awarding only the cost of making copies.
(footnote omitted).
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of costs to the losing party at the conclusion of litigation, the statutory
language "costs of making copies" is ambiguous, especially in the
context of electronically stored information. Not surprisingly, courts
have arrived at conflicting interpretations. Further, even if a court
determines that an expense is potentially subject to cost shifting, it falls
to the court's discretion whether in fact to shift the cost or not.
The prospect for shifting costs to the party requesting discovery
is even less predictable. There are multiple tests for determining
whether cost shifting is appropriate. Each of these tests is a balancing
test; balancing tests are the prototypical standard-like legal test, the
45
results of which are notoriously difficult to predict. Moreover, each of
the balancing tests that different courts employ is distinct-that is, the
46
factors that are balanced vary from court to court. Adding to the
unpredictability is the fact that each of these balancing tests considers
numerous factors. Finally, the division in the courts is not limited to
mere circuit splits; different district courts within a circuit, and indeed
different district judges within a judicial district, apply different tests.
In sum, it is challenging for litigants and lawyers to predict the outcome
of any balancing test. This is especially the case where, as here, a
balancing test considers numerous factors and litigants and lawyers
cannot be sure which balancing test the court will apply.
II. INCENTIVES UNDER PRODUCER-PAYS AND REQUESTER-PAYS RULES
The costs of civil discovery are not burdensome or excessive in
the vast majority of federal cases. 47 In what we believe is the most
recent large study of litigation costs in federal cases, the Federal
Judicial Center ("FJC") found that median litigation costs (including
discovery and attorneys' fees) in cases that involve discovery are only
$15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants. 48 The median case,
however, is a case involving relatively low stakes; according to the FJC
study, the stakes in the median cases ranged between only $160,000
and $200,000.49
45. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 1, at 783 (noting "the complexity and unwieldiness
of the balancing tests used to determine cost shifting").
46. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
47. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 779-82 (2010) ("The empirical studies of discovery costs, in short,
indicate that in the typical case . . . one should expect discovery costs to account for more than 20
percent, on the lower end, and maybe, on the higher end, about half of the total litigation costs.").
48. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED
CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ON CIVIL RULES 35-37 (2009), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/08/CivilRules
Survey2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3WV-H777].
49. Id. at 42.
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Although they represent only a small percentage of overall
litigation, large cases require very different discovery expenditures. In
the FJC study, the five percent of cases with the highest litigation costs
had costs of at least $280,000 for plaintiffs and $300,000 for defendants.
When e-discovery was involved, the litigation costs nearly doubled to at
least $500,000 and $600,000.50 For the discovery-intensive cases in
which the parties both requested and produced discovery, these costs
increased again to $850,000 for plaintiffs and $991,000 for defendants.5 1
The cases in the FJC study, however, are still not indicative of the
largest complex commercial cases; the five percent of cases with the
highest stakes still only involved stakes between $3.9 and $5 million.5 2
In a study of litigation costs in commercial cases involving Fortune 200
companies, Lawyers for Civil Justice ("LCJ") found that average
discovery costs per case ranged from $621,000 to almost $3 million over
a three-year period. In some cases, the discovery costs were as high as
$2.3 to $9.7 million. 53 Moreover, despite these exorbitant discovery
costs, much of the concern about excessive discovery stems not from the
reality of discovery costs but from the threat of extortionate discovery
requests.5 4 Many cases settle so that the producing party can avoid
paying prohibitive discovery costs, and thus the threat of high discovery
costs determines outcomes even if the high discovery costs are never
actually incurred.
In these high-discovery-cost cases, the assignment of discovery
costs to one party or the other can significantly impact the parties'
incentives. This Part discusses the incentives created under both a
producer-pays and a requester-pays rule.
A. The Producer-PaysRule
The current default rule that generally leaves the costs of
discovery with the producing party is justified primarily as an accessto-justice device; it allows plaintiffs to vindicate their rights even when
they cannot pay for the evidence required to litigate their cases.5 5
Although clearly effective in facilitating access for low-resource
plaintiffs, this rule also incentivizes excessive discovery because the
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 35-37.
Id.
Id. at 42.

53.

LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES,

app. 1 at 15 fig.11 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/1itigation-cost-survey of_
major companies_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMG3-KXYG].
54. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637 (1989).
55. Benjamin Spencer, RationalizingCost Allocation in Civil Discovery, 34 REV. LITIG. 769,
773 (2015).
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requesting party has little incentive to compare the costs of the
discovery with the likely benefits from discovery. 56 The requesting

party's marginal cost of demanding additional discovery is generally
very low. The costs are typically limited to the attorneys' fees for
drafting an additional discovery request-though, in limited situations,
they may also include the fees of the producer's expert if an expert is
required to assist the producing party in responding to discovery
requests, the attorneys' fees for drafting a motion to compel, and the
risk of losing the motion to compel and paying the producers' attorneys'
fees for responding to the motion. 5 7 With the relatively low marginal
costs associated with demanding additional discovery, the requester
has the incentive to continue demanding discovery until the marginal
8
benefit of that discovery is also very low. 5 That is, regardless of the cost
of discovery to the producing party, the requester effectively has the
incentive to request discovery for any piece of information that has the
potential (regardless of how small the potential is) to have some positive
value (regardless of how small that positive value is). As a result, the
requester has the incentive to demand "too much" discovery from a
social perspective-that is, an amount of discovery for which the
marginal cost to the producer and requester exceeds the marginal
benefit of the discovery produced.
The producer-pays rule thus presents a simple externality story:
because the requesting party can externalize the costs of discovery, it is
predictable that he will overrequest and demand discovery that is not
cost-justified. Indeed, the empirical data illustrate that requesters
demand discovery with little or no value, even though the producing
parties certainly incur costs in producing it. In the LCJ study previously
discussed, an average of 4.9 million pages of documents were produced
59
in discovery requests in major cases at trial. Only one-tenth of one
60
percent of those documents, however, were actually used in trial.
Thus, the other 99.9 percent of discovery-information that cost the
producing party thousands or millions of dollars to provide-was
worthless to the requesting party.
Furthermore, because requesting parties can externalize the
costs of discovery, they have the incentive to make discovery requests

56. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 1, at 792, 796-805 ("Because each party bears the
costs of producing the information that will be used against it by its opponent, each party
effectively subsidizes that portion of its opponent's case.").
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E).
58. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 452 (1994).
59.

LAwYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 53, at 16.

60.

Id.
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solely to impose burdensome costs on producing parties. 6 1 Significant
discovery costs can alter the producing parties' calculus of whether to
proceed with discovery or settle a case and may often compel them to
acquiesce to the settlement demands of requesting parties in order to
avoid extortionate discovery costs. For example, the General Counsel of
General Electric has publicly claimed that ninety percent of the
company's settlement decisions are driven by the costs of discovery, not
the merits of the cases. 62 Even the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that discovery can be used for such in terrorem effect: "[T]he threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases before reaching" summary judgment. 63
This "impositional function" 64 of discovery-that is, discovery
sought purely for the purpose of imposing costs on the producing
party-can result in the settlement of meritless claims in which
litigants not entitled to recover under the law nevertheless obtain a
settlement. This can, in turn, overdeter parties from engaging in
activities that might result in future meritless claims that would be
settled in an effort to avoid discovery costs; because the parties cannot
avoid incurring costs even when they are in the right, the only way to
avoid costs is to refrain from the underlying activity altogether. For
activities that are socially valuable, such as the production of medicines
or efficiency-enhancing technology, a reduction in activity to avoid
impositional discovery requests is harmful to society.
B. The Requester-PaysRule
A rule that requires the requesting party to pay for the
producers' costs of discovery would create very different incentives.
First, a requester-pays rule would minimize requesters' ability to use
discovery as an in terrorem device because requesters would not be able
to impose costs on their adversaries through extortionate discovery
demands. This would reduce the occasions in which litigants with
meritless claims could force a settlement from an adversary attempting

61. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the LitigationMatrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 603
(2001) ("[T]he fact that a party's opponent will have to bear the financial burden of preparing the
discovery response actually gives litigants an incentive to make discovery requests . . . .").
62. Jon Kyl & E. Donald Elliott, Comment to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
Proposed Amendments to Rule 26 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 (2013), http://www.1fcj.com/
uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/kylandelliottjoint comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJP6-Y8R3].
63. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
64. The term "impositional function" was first coined in John K. Setear, The Barristerand
the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation,Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV.
569 (1989).
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to avoid discovery costs. 6 5 If litigants with meritless claims could no

longer recover, this would, in turn, decrease the number of meritless or
frivolous claims filed in the first place.
A rule requiring the requesting party to pay for discovery would
also force the requester to consider the costs of the discovery production.
Because the requesting party could no longer externalize the costs of
his discovery requests, he would have the incentive to only request
discovery for which he expected the benefits to exceed the costs. The
externality that was created under the producer-pays rule by allowing
requesting parties to impose costs on producing parties would be
eliminated. Instead of "too much" discovery, the requester would have
the incentive to request an amount of discovery closer to the socially
optimum level-that is, the amount of discovery for which the marginal
benefits are at least as great as the marginal costs. 6 6 Although the

requester's perception of the likely value of discovery may not comport
with its actual value, the requester would, at a minimum, only request
discovery that he expected to have some non-negligible, positive value.
Forcing the requesting party to confine its requests to only the discovery
he thinks is worthwhile would minimize frivolous requests or requests
that are nothing more than "fishing expeditions."
By requiring the requesting party to pay for the production of
discovery, however, a requester-pays rule may overdeter discovery
requests. Trying to reduce their costs, requesters may narrow their
requests to only the discovery with the highest likely value. If, in turn,
these narrow requests miss some piece of useful information, the
requester-pays rule would hinder the ability of the parties and the court
to resolve the dispute on its merits. This would, in turn, impair both the
compensatory and deterrent functions of civil litigation. 67
Furthermore, knowing they would have to pay to produce the
discovery necessary to prove their case, some requesting parties may
refrain from bringing claims in the first place. Although, as previously
65. On the other hand, litigation is costly to both the litigants and society, so fewer
prediscovery settlements may increase trials and overall litigation expenses. Jonah Gelbach,
Discovering Coase 24-25 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.northwestern.edul
research-faculty/colloquium/law-economics/documents/2015 %2FallGelbach-Discovering.pdf
[https://perma.cclEV7G-XGSQ].
66. See Ronald J. Allen, How to Think About Errors, Costs, and Their Allocation, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 885, 894 (2012) ("[P]lacing the costs of discovery provisionally on the person asking for
it .. . may .. . give incentives for the optimal production of information . . ."). The amount of
discovery may actually be "too low" or below the social optimum if the information revealed during
discovery creates a positive externality for third parties. See Jonah Gelbach, supra note 65, at 2223 (discussing how the "aggressively pursued discovery" in Minnesota tobacco litigation resulted
in the release of numerous industry reports that likely contributed to reduced tobacco consumption
in the United States).
67. Spencer, supra note 55, at 803.
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discussed, some of the deterred claims may be frivolous or meritless,
others may be legitimate claims. A requesting party would have little
incentive to file a legitimate claim if either the party could not afford to
pay the costs of discovery production or the expense of pursuing the
claim outweighed the potential recovery. The failure to bring legitimate
claims would mean that some legitimate injuries would go
uncompensated and some wrongful behavior would go unpunished and,
in turn, undeterred.
Finally, in the same way that some requesters exploit the
current producer-pays rule to drive up discovery costs for their
adversaries, producers could exploit a requester-pays rule to increase
costs for their adversaries. Producers would have the incentive to
maintain information in a way that makes its production costprohibitive to a requesting party.6 8 If the producing party can increase
the costs of producing the discovery to a sufficient level, they may deter
the requesting party from seeking the information or from pursuing a
claim altogether. As previously discussed, for useful information and
legitimate claims, precluding this discovery or the entire claim would
detract from the compensatory and deterrent functions of civil
litigation.
In sum, both producer-pays and requester-pays regimes create
negative incentives that can affect litigants' abilities to vindicate their
rights. As we explain in the next Part, a rule requiring both parties to
share the costs of discovery (cost-sharing rule) or a rule creating a risk
for both parties that they will bear the entire costs of discovery (costshifting rule) would ameliorate some of these negative incentives.
III. A COST-SHIFTING OR COST-SHARING PROPOSAL
As we discussed in Part I, the current regime for allocating the
costs of discovering electronically stored information lacks clarity along
almost every possible metric. First, the governing precedent is
remarkably cloudy. The governing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure does
not speak to the allocation of costs. 6 9 The Advisory Committee Notes

allude to the allocation of costs but leave it ambiguous exactly how the
balancing test announced by the Notes for determining good cause to
obtain electronically stored information should apply to cost
allocation. 70 Courts remain divided over whether the Notes' balancing
test applies, the common law test that predates the 2006 amendment
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 804.
See supra notes 12-15, 24.
See supra note 13 (discussing FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2006

amendment).
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applies, or some amalgam of these tests applies.7 1 And, whichever
version of the test a court chooses to apply, it will be a balancing test, 7 2
which is the paradigm for an unpredictable standard (as opposed to a
rule). 73 Finally, the scope of the statute governing the shifting of costs
to the losing party in the context of electronically stored information is
also subject to debate. In short, the question of shifting the costs of
discovering electronically stored information is unpredictable in
numerous ways.74
Moreover, as the current approach often results in producers
paying the costs of discovery, it creates incentives for excessive
discovery requests. Because requesters can externalize the costs of
discovery, they have the incentive both to demand discovery that is not
cost-justified and to make discovery requests solely to impose costs on
producing parties.
In this Part, we propose reforming the allocation of discovery
costs to reduce both the unpredictability of and the incentives for
excessive discovery requests.
A. Our Proposal
We propose that the current approach be replaced with a clear
default rule under which discovery costs are either shared or shifted
among the litigants, unless imposition of such a rule would create an
undue hardship for one of the parties. To determine whether an undue
hardship would be created, a court might consider whether a party is
proceeding pro bono or in forma pauperis; whether a party is an
individual or class representative (as opposed to a legal entity); whether
a party is sophisticated, a repeat litigant, or wealthy; and whether
75
third-party investors are funding a litigant's case.
We believe this rule mirrors the type of private arrangement
governing cost allocation that parties would choose to enter voluntarily.
In an ex ante setting before the parties know whether they will be a
requesting party or producing party, their overarching goal would be to
provide efficient incentives to both requesters and producers. The
parties would prefer discovery cost-allocation rules that do not provide
71. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 35-36.
73. See, e.g., Nash, supra note 34, at 521.
74. Also crowding the landscape are local court rules. See Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery
Beyond the FederalRules, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 321, 339 (2008).
75. Cf. Alon Klement & Robert Klonoff, Class Actions in the United States and Israel: A
Comparative Approach, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 151, 188-89 (2018) (noting the risks
undertaken by class representatives under Israeli, but not U.S., law, pursuant to which "class
representatives risk paying the defendants' costs if defendants prevail").
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requesters with incentives to seek excessive discovery nor provide
producers with incentives to drive up the costs of producing discovery.
The importance of a default rule producing efficient incentives
is demonstrated by the Coase Theorem,7 6 which, despite Professor
Jonah Gelbach's efforts,7 7 has not sufficiently been applied to discovery
(nor, indeed, to civil procedure writ large). A central tenet of the
theorem is that clarity will enhance the prospect for the parties to
bargain to an efficient outcome. Another of the theorem's central tenets
is that, because transaction costs are often high enough to prevent
bargaining, it is important to have default rules in place that come as
close as possible to the efficient outcome were bargaining to have
occurred.7 8
A cost-shifting rule would tie cost reversal to success at a stage
of litigation relatively close to discovery. For example, cost reversal
could be tied to success at summary judgment. 79 Of course, even though
success at summary judgment is more likely to be tied to successful
discovery than is ultimate success at trial,8 0 the fact remains that
discovery could generate information that bolsters the requester's legal
arguments and yet still finds the requester losing at summary
judgment. A preferable, yet more costly, system might tie cost reversal
to a determination by a neutral third party, such as an arbitrator or
magistrate judge, that the requested discovery in fact generated, or did
not generate, valuable information for the requester. At least one court
has invoked such an arrangement.8 1
76. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
77. See Gelbach, supra note 65.
78. See Coase, supra note 76, at 19.
79. Cameron Norris analyzes this possibility in detail in another contribution to this
symposium. See Cameron Norris, One-Way Fee Shifting After Summary Judgment, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 2117 (2018).
80. First, summary judgment turns entirely on evidence obtained in discovery, while
judgment at trial turns on additional evidence introduced (specifically, testimony of witnesses);
some would also argue that the jury introduces its own element of unpredictability, at least in
some cases. Second, there is an argument that the further a case proceeds in the litigation process,
the closer the likelihood that either side could prevail. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Unearthing
Summary Judgment's Concealed Standardof Review, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 87, 125-26 (2016). If
that is true, then winning at trial may be probabilistically a very close call; in that case, the real
focus should be on whether discovery produced information that produced a setting in which the
case was a close call. That would seem to be a difficult determination to make in many cases.
81. See Boehm v. Scheels all Sports, Inc., No. 15-CV-379-JDP, 2016 WL 6462213, at *1 (W.D.
Wis. Nov. 1, 2016):
Several factors weigh in favor of granting plaintiffs' motion [on whether discovery is
appropriate] .... So the court will order [Defendant] to permit a neutral thirdparty ediscovery expert to inspect all electronic records and systems in [Defendant's]
possession, custody, or control .... Plaintiffs must pay the costs associated with this
inspection, but they may move to recover their costs as a sanction against [Defendant] if
the inspection uncovers any discovery violations.
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The move toward greater managerial judging also offers
opportunity for cost shifting (and cost sharing). 82 Judges can structure
discovery to proceed in stages. 83 A judge might leave the producer-pays
rule in effect for the initial stage but then introduce cost shifting in later
stages.84 Alternatively, a judge might provide for cost shifting in a
subsequent stage if an earlier stage did not produce information that
justified further stages of discovery.
Such a system need not be overly costly if it is used by numerous
litigants over time. Just as private arbitration systems (including
arbitrators) have arisen in other contexts where there is demand, 85 one
can imagine such an arbitration system arising here. If a court is
unwilling to delegate such authority outside the judicial system, 86
however, a magistrate judge presents a viable alternative. District
judges already use magistrate judges to manage discovery on a regular
basis.8 7 And to the extent there is concern that the magistrate judge
already handling discovery in a case or recommending the disposition
of a future summary judgment motion8 8 might be compromised by
conducting such a review, another magistrate judge could be selected to
perform just the cost-reversal determination.
Another possibility would be a cost-sharing rule that requires
requesters and producers to share the cost of discovery. The exact share
born by each party is not so important as long as each side incurs a
material burden in the discovery process. Indeed, the share may vary
by the types of litigants involved, nature of the claims, relative size of
discovery, and other factors. A cost-sharing rule would generally be less

(emphasis added).
82. See generally E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 306 (1986).
83. See, e.g., Judicial Conference of the United States, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
Final Report, 175 F.R.D. 62, 70 (1997) ("[T1he principle of staged discovery management was
included in the 1993 amendments to F.R.Civ.P. 26.").
84. See, e.g., Fed. Circuit Advisory Council, An E-Discovery Model Order, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J.
347, 349 (2012) (proposing that "a discovering party should [not] be precluded from obtaining
more e-discovery than agreed upon by the parties or allowed by the court," and "[riather [that],
the discovering party shall bear all reasonable costs of discovery that exceeds these limits"). We
are grateful to Professor Bruce Kobayashi for this example.
85. Cameron Norris analyzes this possibility in detail in another contribution to this
symposium. See Norris, supra note 79.
86. See Matthew A. Shapiro, DelegatingProcedure, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 993-1014 (2018)
(describing how many extant procedural devices, including discovery, can be recast as delegations
by courts on litigants).
87. See, e.g., David A. Bell, The Power to Award Sanctions: Does It Belong in the Hands of

Magistrate Judges?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 433, 433 (1997) ("Magistrate judges are often called
upon ... to rule on discovery and suppression of evidence motions. . . ").
88. See, e.g., id. ("Magistrate judges are often called upon .. . to . . issue reports and
recommendations on dispositive motions . . . .").
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costly to administer than a cost-shifting rule that requires third parties
to determine whether discovery has yielded valuable information.
B. Benefits of Our Proposal
Our proposal offers several advantages over the current
discovery cost-allocation rule that is somewhat unpredictable but
typically results in producers paying the costs of discovery.
First, both the cost-shifting and cost-sharing rules minimize
many of the negative incentives that exist under either a strict
producer-pays or requester-pays rule. Recall from our earlier discussion
that a producer-pays rule creates incentives for excessive discovery
because requesters can externalize the costs of requests and use
discovery to impose costs on producing parties to force settlement. On
the other hand, although a requester-pays rule minimizes the
incentives for excessive discovery, it gives producers the incentive to
drive up the costs of producing discovery and has the potential to create
an access-to-justice problem if financially constrained litigants are
overdeterred from making useful discovery requests or bringing claims
altogether. Either of our proposals would minimize these negative
incentives. By either requiring both parties to share the costs of
discovery or creating a risk for both parties that they will bear the entire
cost of discovery, the proposals minimize the risk of both excessive
discovery requests and inflated production costs. Because the requester
either shares the costs of discovery or risks paying the entire cost of
discovery, he has the incentive to consider the costs of his requests. He
can no longer externalize the costs of his discovery requests and can no
longer abuse discovery to force settlement because he must either bear
the cost or risk impositional discovery. Similarly, because the producer
either shares the discovery costs or risks paying the entire cost, he has
little incentive to drive up the costs of production to deter discovery
requests. Finally, by including an undue hardship exception, this
proposal also minimizes access-to-justice issues because both parties
will generally be able to afford the discovery costs.
Second, compared to the current approach, our proposal would
result in a more predictable rule governing discovery cost allocation.
Clarity is essential for successful bargaining between the litigants. 89
Only if both parties are reasonably certain what rule the court will
apply if their bargaining fails will one party be able to assess the value

89. See generallyRobert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model
of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (discussing the influences on pretrial
bargaining).
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of an offer made by the other party or, for that matter, be able to
formulate its own economically rational offer. Clarity reduces the
transaction costs to bargaining and thus, as demonstrated by the Coase
Theorem, 90 assists the parties in bargaining to reach the most efficient
outcome. 91 To be sure, we need not-and do not-call for absolute
clarity. Some ambiguity in the outcome of cost shifting laudably would
discourage parties from seeking discovery right up to the cost-shifting
line. 92 Essentially, however, the existing tests for cost shifting are
abysmally unclear; our proposal would introduce far greater clarity.
Finally, our proposed default rule is one which parties are free
to opt out of in favor of an alternative regime of their own choosing. In
settings where transaction costs make bargaining difficult, the default
rule would resemble regimes to which parties would freely bargaineither a cost-shifting or cost-sharing rule-unless such a rule would
create an undue hardship for one of the parties. In low transaction cost
settings, however, litigants would be free to opt out of the default rule.
Opting out of the default rule may produce more efficient
outcomes in some circumstances. Opting out may free litigants to
engage in litigation signaling. 93 Under either a cost-shifting or costsharing rule (or a requester-pays rule, for that matter), a strong
defendant could try to signal his strength by opting out of the default
rule and offering to take on the plaintiffs share of discovery costs if the
defendant loses. Giving strong defendants an opportunity to signal the
strength of their cases reduces uncertainty about likely case outcomes
and mitigates asymmetric information among litigants. This facilitates
settlement, limiting the number of cases that proceed to trial and
helping plaintiffs avoid many cases for which they would otherwise
incur litigation costs but lose at trial. In contrast, no such signaling
opportunity exists under a producer-pays default rule because the
defendant would pay discovery costs whether he won or lost under such
a rule. As such, a voluntary offer to shift costs would not impose any
additional burden on a losing defendant, making it meaningless and
devoid of any signal.

90. See Coase, supra note 76.
91. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Reasons Without Passions:Emotions and Intentions in Property
Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435, 465-66 (2000) (discussing the efficiency and invariance
claims of the Coase Theorem).
92. Cf. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930) ("[Tlhe very
meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not
pass it.").
93. See generally Shay Lavie & Avraham Tabbach, Litigation Signals, 58 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1 (2018).
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CONCLUSION

The current regime for allocating the costs of discovery, and of
discovering electronically stored information in particular, is
unpredictable in numerous ways. The governing Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure does not speak to the allocation of costs, and the Advisory
Committee Notes allude to the allocation of costs but do not clarify how
costs should be allocated. Courts contribute to the uncertainty by
disagreeing about whether the Advisory Committee Notes' call for cost
allocation should apply and by employing balancing tests that reach
unpredictable conclusions. This lack of clarity impedes bargaining
among the litigants because they are unable to reasonably ascertain
which rule will apply.
Moreover, because the current approach to allocating discovery
costs often results in producers paying the costs of discovery, it creates
incentives for excessive discovery requests. Because requesters can
externalize the costs of discovery, they have the incentive both to
demand discovery that is not cost-justified and to make discovery
requests solely to impose costs on producing parties.
In this Article, we proposed reforming the allocation of discovery
costs to reduce both the unpredictability of and the incentives for
excessive discovery requests. We propose that the current approach be
replaced with a clear, default rule under which discovery costs are
either shared or shifted among the litigants, unless imposition of such
a rule would create an undue hardship for one of the parties. Our
proposal would result in a more predictable rule governing discovery
cost allocation, facilitating bargaining between the parties. Moreover,
by either requiring both parties to share the costs of discovery or
creating a risk for both parties that they will bear the entire cost, the
proposal reduces the risk of excessive discovery requests. In contrast to
the current rule, a cost-sharing or cost-shifting rule can also provide
potentially useful litigation signaling that could reduce overall
litigation costs. Given concerns about the rising costs of discovery and
debate over discovery's acceptable scope, the ability of litigation signals
to convey relevant and important information without the expense of
discovery is potentially invaluable.

